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Remembering Erving Goffman and Herbert Blumer 
Neil Smelser: 
At the End of That First Year or So I Would Say That I Became  
as Close to Erving as Anyone Else in the Sociology Department 
 
Dr. Neil Smelser, professor emeritus of sociology at the University of California Berkley, 
wrote these memoirs at the request of Dmitri Shalin and gave his permission to post them 
in the Erving Goffman Archives. 
[Posted 05-24-09] 
 
May 24, 2009 
 
Dear Dimitri Shalin - 
I have drawn up some recollections of the years of my friendship 
with Erving Goffman and attach them for your archives, because as 
far as I know there is some material in my notes that is not 
produced elsewhere.  The material is attached. 




I first met Erving Goffman at an informal departmental lunch in the 
fall of 1958, when I first came to Berkeley as an assistant professor 
of sociology.  We sat next to one another and talked for most of the 
time.  This first interchange was not a pleasant occasion.  Erving 
immediately went on the offensive, making one aggressive remark 
after another about Harvard (from where I had just come), Talcott 
Parsons (with whom I had co-authored a volume and who was my 
principal thesis supervisor), and other topics on which he apparently 
thought I was vulnerable.  It was clear he had heard about my 
coming to Berkeley and he had heard a few essential facts about 
me.  His comments were sharp but rather stereotyped.  I was 
annoyed at this behavior, but I didn’t rise to the bait and let the 
insults roll of my back in that initial meeting.  
In subsequent meetings his aggressive style continued.  I had heard 
in the meantime that this was a general type of come-on for Erving, 
and I also witnessed similar assaults on others.  I began to counter 
this style by asking him why he was continuing this kind of baiting, 
and on some occasions I returned fire.  I don’t know whether my 
style had anything to do with it, but over time, during that first year 
of our acquaintance his style began to mellow—and, as a result, 
mine did, too—and we began to progress toward a better 
relationship, first a more civil one, and moving toward one of 
honest, frank, and respectful intellectual discussions our one 
another’s work, of social theory, and then to the development of an 
outright friendship.  At the end of that first year or so I would say 
that I became as close to Erving as anyone else in the sociology 
department.  My sense was that Harold Wilensky and I became his 
two best friends.   In that new context we came to be able to 
criticize one another without playing games or bringing any complex 
baggage to our conversations.  I remember on one occasion I asked 
Erving—in connection with his intended study of gambling in the Las 
Vegas casinos—why he seemed to have gone out of his way to 
select such an “odd”, far-out setting and suggested that he would 
get much more intellectual mileage and more serious attention if he 
turned his approach to the stock market and other more legitimate 
institutions.  My questions set off, not a sharp exchange as might be 
expected with Erving, but a serious intellectual discussion of the 
selection of research sites and how sociological research could be 
made more credible or less credible.  For his entire remaining time 
at Berkeley, Erving and I remained good friends.  We did so 
afterwards as well, though I saw him only rarely after he went to 
Pennsylvania.  About a year before his death he and Gillian came to 
Berkeley for a prolonged visit and lived only a few houses away 
from us; we saw one another several times during that visit, and it 
was especially gratifying to renew our relationship one more time 
before his death. I always felt it a major tragedy that Erving was 
not able to deliver his Presidential Address at the American 
Sociological Association a few months after that. 
I mention two special moments to signify how close we became in 
the first five or six years of our acquaintance.  In 1963, when my 
first marriage was dissolving in a sea of conflict and unhappiness, 
Erving volunteered to testify as a witness on my behalf in what was 
looming as a bitter court fight over property and child custody; I did 
not ask him to do so.   He knew my first wife, and I think he 
possessed some incriminating facts about her, though he was very 
straightforward with me as to what he was willing to say and what 
he was not willing to say in court.  As it turned out, there was not a 
court fight; the two attorneys engineered a settlement that avoided 
that unpleasantness.  But I was forever grateful to Erving for his 
kindness and support.   The second involved his wife.  In 
befriending Erving I also befriended Schuyler (Skye) as well.  She 
was a very troubled person, and his marriage was a troubled 
one.  In particular, she went into some kind of psychological tailspin 
after the assassination of John Kennedy in November of 1963.  That 
in turn drifted into a kind of hyper-manic stage, in which she 
developed a fix on the idea that she, using the money in her family, 
could, with the help with a number of us (myself included), launch 
into some kind of world-saving enterprise.  I did not let myself get 
drawn into her scheme, which I regarded as hopelessly unrealistic, 
but I maintained a friendly and supportive relationship to her and 
Erving throughout.   When that mania turned into deep depression, 
it was not long before her psychological state propelled her into that 
dramatic suicide leap off the Richmond Bridge (I never drive over 
that bridge without remembering that moment).  After the event a 
number of those closest to Irving (Fred Davis from San Diego, 
David Schneider from Chicago, Hal Wilensky and a few others I 
cannot remember) gathered and stayed at Erving’s house 
continuously for a couple of days.  I took on the special (unplanned) 
role of spending long periods of time with their son, Tom, during 
those days.  It is also notable that Erving opened up to me about 
the problems of his marriage during that unhappy time, and I know 
that this kind of intimacy was rare for Erving.   I have never been 
able to understand how Erving and I became close; we had very 
different personalities and personal styles; we were very different 
kinds of sociologists; we had different cultural backgrounds (I came 
from Protestant background and grew up in Phoenix, Arizona); and 
we had different conceptions of human nature.  Despite this lack of 
initial bases for mutual understanding and friendship, I consider the 
relationship to be one of the truly gratifying ones of my life.  I 
always felt that Erving did not look down on me (except at the 
beginning) and I did not look down on him. 
For a year or two Erving and I were in a poker group with a number 
other individuals—Irving Piliavin, Henry Miller, Bill Kornhauser, Hal 
Wilensky, David Matza, for a while Ernest Becker, and a couple of 
others.  We played every two weeks.  Erving turned out to be a very 
poor poker player.  Most of the time he lost money in our friendly 
game.   An ironic twist was that he also turned out to be very 
unimpressive as an impression-manager.  He was far from being a 
poker-face.  I used to joke that if he were dealt as much as a pair of 
deuces his hands would begin to tremble and his face would begin 
to flush.  Given his work and his pride in his insights about the 
manipulation of human situations, one would have expected Erving 
to be a Mr. Cool, a good bluffer, and a good strategist.  He 
displayed none of these characteristics, and I suspect that his 
notable lack of success led to his relatively short tenure as member 
of the group. 
I always regarded Erving as a truly brilliant man and a wonderful 
sociologist, deserving all of the awards and reputation he enjoyed 
during his lifetime and after his death.  On a few occasions I 
assigned his work in my graduate theory course and analyzed it in 
my lectures.  I noted central themes in his work, such as a very 
remote variety of rational choice theory—with the actor treated as a 
rational one, given the master principle of the protection and 
projection of self-image.  I also noted a remote paranoid streak in 
the writing, evident in his treatment of the actor as navigating in 
the midst of others’ manipulative and phony behaviors.  Erving’s 
brilliance, however, was his very own, and not transferable to 
others.  He had very few graduate students at Berkeley, none of 
whom matched him in intellectual ability or quality.  Students were 
somewhat afraid of him, in my recollection, because he did not like 
teaching very much and could be impatient and 
downputting.  Erving was an average citizen with respect to his 
commitment to and participation in the Department of 
Sociology.  He came across as something of a cynic.  
It so happened that I sat next to Erving in the very historic massive 
meeting of the Academic Senate on December 8, 1964, following 
the massive sit-in in Sproul Hall by the Free Speech Movement.  It 
was at that meeting that the faculty voted, by something like an 8-1 
margin, to urge liberalization of the rules regarding political activity 
on the Berkeley campus (thereby siding with the student activists 
and repudiating the Chancellor, Edward Strong, who subsequently 
was eased from office by the Board of Regents).  Erving and I voted 
with the majority.  During the whole meeting Erving carried on a 
running commentary on the meeting and its speeches and 
arguments, largely poking fun at the proceedings and treating the 
meeting as something as a drama of the absurd.  That kind of 
demeanor was what earned him that reputation as a cynic and a 
loner.  That reputation was confirmed in an incident at the meeting 
of the American Sociological Association, at which Erving won the 
Sorokin prize, I think for his book on The Presentation of 
Self.  Though he was in the convention hotel at the time, he would 
not show up for the presentation. 
Charles Glock has written about the circumstances of Erving’s 
departure for Penn.  I was often with Erving (along with Hal 
Wilensky) during the weeks before his decision to leave.  We were 
both very dismayed at the prospect of his leaving, and worked as 
hard as we could to present arguments and reasons for why he 
should stay at Berkeley.  But the situation became a tough one for 
everybody involved.  Erving was putting a demand on the 
Department that he be permitted to teach half-time but at full 
salary.  Such arrangements were not unheard of at Berkeley, but in 
all cases the faculty member had to seek relief by securing external 
research support and thus “buying off” his time or by securing a 
research appointment in an organized research unit (I myself was 
subsequently given a permanent half-time salary on state funds by 
the Institute of International Studies and remained on a half-time 
research appointment for the remainder of my active career; Bob 
Bellah also got a similar appointment on Ford Foundation 
funds).  But Erving would have none of that kind of understanding; 
he wanted the half-time arrangement as an outright gift.  This put 
the Department in an almost impossible position.  When Hal and I 
heard about this demand, we continued to urge Erving to stay at 
Berkeley, but we both agreed that this particular demand was 
unreasonable, unfair to his colleagues, and impossible; furthermore, 
we expressed this opinion to him directly.  Erving would not budge 
from his position, and his departure was thereby almost 
guaranteed.  I was extremely disappointed with his leaving, but I 
have never questioned the rightness of the position that Hal and I 
(and ultimately the Department) took. 
  
May 25, 2009 
 
Dear Dimitri - 
 
I told you yesterday that I was uncertain about writing anything 
down about Herb Blumer because my relationship with him was 
remote. However, your request set me thinking (and I suppose I 
was in a memoir mood after writing about Erving), so I seized the 
moment and put down my recollections.  They are attached.  The 
piece is about the same length as the one on Erving, but is probably 
less revealing because there was less of a relationship there.  At the 
same time, I suppose most of what is going into the Blumer 
recollections is of a more positive and intimate nature--I know he 
had many admirers and grateful students--so my piece may 
at least have some uniqueness. 
 





Submitted by Neil Smelser 
The first time I met Herbert Blumer was when I visited the 
University of California, Berkeley in the winter of 1957, when I first 
came to the campus for job interviews.  I was just finishing my 
doctoral dissertation at Harvard and had come on to the job 
market.  I had not been offered the job as yet, but I was confident, 
both because the market for young sociologists was very strong at 
the time, and Talcott Parsons, my thesis supervisor (and with whom 
I had completed co-authoring Economy and Society) had given me 
good press to the Berkeley campus.  Ultimately I received an offer 
from Berkeley (the day after my visit) and competing offers at the 
Assistant Professor level at Michigan and Harvard. 
As chair of the department, Blumer had me into his office during the 
one-and-one-half day visit.  He was quite formal and distant, 
officially describing the position and asking me some questions 
about my work, but revealing little else about Berkeley or about 
himself (all I really knew about him at the time of the visit was that 
I had read his work on collective behavior; his work on symbolic 
interactionism was not really in the intellectual culture of Harvard 
during my graduate-school years).  Several other faculty 
members—especially Marty Lipset, but also Reinhard Bendix, 
Hannan Selvin, and Leo Lowenthal—were actively welcoming and 
extremely sociable (Lowenthal even told me during the first day of 
the visit that I was surely going to be offered the job).  I attributed 
Blumer’s aloofness to the fact that he was officially the chair and 
that, because I hadn’t actually been offered the job.  But it also 
struck me as odd that, on the day after the visit when I was visiting 
the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences 
(Stanford), it was not Blumer but Lipset who telephoned me and 
said the job was mine if I wanted it.  (It was a comical phone call, 
because I talked to Lipset on the phone in the presence of Talcott 
Parsons [my mentor and a Fellow at the Center at the time] who 
was standing beside me and whispering urgently again and again, 
“Don’t say yes!”, because he knew a Harvard position was going to 
be offered to me).  I accepted the Berkeley offer a few weeks later, 
but in keeping with my reading of my visit, I informed Lipset, not 
Blumer of my decision, and nobody asked me to inform Blumer). 
When I arrived at Berkeley the following fall, Bendix had just come 
into the chairmanship, so all official arrangements were handled 
through him.  I didn’t really see much of Blumer during the first 
year, and he didn’t seek me out at all.  During the second year, 
however, I took the initiative in setting up a meeting with him.  We 
had a lunch at the faculty club at my invitation.  The reason for this 
was that I had been working very hard since I had come to Berkeley 
on what would become Theory of Collective Behavior.  I know that 
Blumer was one of the figures in that field, and I wanted feedback 
on chapters that I was drafting on the panic, the craze, and the 
hostile outburst.  I asked Herb if he would read one of the chapters 
(on panic, I believe) and give me feedback and he agreed.  We 
arranged to have another lunch a couple of weeks later.  During 
that lunch Herb obviously showed that he had read the 
material.  He gave no overall judgment—either encouraging or 
discouraging—but seemed to land on one major point, and he 
repeated that point again and again in different ways.  The essence 
of his objection was that I was giving too much emphasis to 
structural determinants of the panic process and too little attention 
to the perceptions and meanings and interpretations of the actors 
involved.  This point was of course consistent with his symbolic-
interactionist perspective, and also consistent with his ongoing 
critique of Parsons and other functionalists who, he believed, 
regarded the actor as the passive vessel through which structural 
forces passed and determine the actor’s behavior.  I heard Blumer 
and I think his message led me to think somewhat differently about 
the kinds of interpretations I was developing, but in a way his 
objection, if I had taken it seriously, would have undermined my 
entire theoretical perspective and would have led me to write an 
entirely different book.  So I can say that I responded only 
partially—and, I suppose, minimally in Herb’s opinion—to his critical 
approach. 
A month or so later I sent him a copy of the next chapter on crazes, 
asking him for feedback on that one, too.  This time we did not have 
a lunch.  Instead, he wrote me a very long letter (six or seven 
single-spaced pages, as I recall).   In this letter he developed the 
very same line of objections as he had put forward in the lunch, and 
the letter was as repetitive as the luncheon conversation had been. 
I wrote an equally long letter back to him, explaining and defending 
my position and implicitly criticizing his.  I still remained undaunted, 
and in the end sent him almost every chapter of the book.  He 
responded to all of them by letter, but after a while the 
correspondence became boring, because his points were always the 
same, and my responses tended to be the same, too.  There must 
have accumulated almost fifty pages of correspondence.  I gave him 
credit in the Preface of the book, but in reading those words 
recently, I think I was more generous than I really felt. 
Herb and I served together on a number of orals examinations for 
graduate students, I examining usually in social theory, he in social 
psychology.  I didn’t like his style very much, and was embarrassed 
by it.  He would always ask the same questions, focusing on George 
Herbert Mead’s theory of personal interaction.  He would ask the 
students to reproduce Mead’s point of view, and if the students 
didn’t use the right words, he would continue to ask until the 
student would get it right.  I felt it was demeaning to the students, 
and more about Herb’s insistence on things that in revealing the 
students’ command of material and analytic abilities. 
We also appeared together on panels at scholarly conferences and 
ASA meetings.  I remember one line of exchange that was 
especially striking.  I ventured a theoretical critique of the symbolic 
interactionist approach—I thought it was civil enough—namely that 
with the insistence on the idiosyncrasy of the meanings that guided 
actors’ behaviors—the approach (a variant of phenomenology) was 
caught in a position of not being able to generalize but only to tell 
descriptive stories, and for that reason found itself difficult to 
measure up to the scientific canon of seeking generalizations about 
human behavior.  Herb reacted very strongly to this point, because 
he prided himself on the empiricist characteristic of the symbolic-
interactionist approach (“you have to dig for the facts” was his 
phrase), and resented any suggestion that it was non-scientific or 
anti-scientific. 
Between 1962 and 1965 I was editor-in-chief of the American 
Sociological Review.  It was a rewarding experience, but one of the 
more difficult side issues was that quite a number of Berkeley 
colleagues sent me manuscripts, thinking, perhaps, that this 
younger colleague (though I had been promoted to Full Professor in 
1962) would be an easier touch than another editor.  Herb was one 
of those who contacted me.  He submitted a manuscript on 
economic development, which he had prepared in the course of an 
academic visitorship in Brazil.  The essence of his argument was 
that development was a pragmatic, seeking process, and difficult to 
generalize about.  I sent the ms. out for review, and the reviews 
were generally negative.  I had to reject the manuscript and tried to 
do so diplomatically, but Herb was quite gruff about the decision, 
attributing it to reviewers’ (and presumably my) intellectual 
rigidity.  That decision didn’t help our relationship at all, though the 
situation didn’t develop into any kind of fight. 
I seldom saw Herb socially at parties and other kinds of 
gatherings.  When we did meet, we were always civil but distant 
from one another, finding it difficult to find things to talk about.  I 
often wondered why we never really broke through the 
aloofness.  After all, we had a lot in common: we were both Missouri 
boys (I was born in northern Missouri, and though I grew up in 
Phoenix, Arizona, my family and I visited the state numerous times, 
and I felt Missouri roots); we were of common ethnic stock; we both 
were sports fans.  But we never came to the point of having a 
personal relationship, much less a friendship.  I felt he was shy, 
certainly more so than I, because I did develop collegial and friendly 
relationships with others.  At one point I even entertained the 
implausible thought that Herb might be afraid of me, because that 
seemed to be consistent with his behavior; but it was implausible 
because he was twice my age and was certainly an established 
scholar and sociologist.  In the end I suppose it was because of a 
theoretical impasse.  Herb regarded me as hopelessly wrong-
headed and beyond his influence (he once introduced me to an 
academic in what I suppose he thought were flattering terms, 
saying that Talcott Parsons regarded me as his best student; he 
couldn’t give his own opinion but quoted that of a theoretical foe).  I 
regarded him as hopelessly dogmatic.  We couldn’t get beyond that 
impasse, and what might have developed as an intellectual and 
even a personal relationship never had a chance to do so. 
